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ABSTRACT
The DNS Bake Sale: Advertising DNS Cookie Support for DDoS
Protection
Jacob Davis
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
The Domain Name System (DNS) has been frequently abused for Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks and cache poisoning because it relies on the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP). Since UDP is connection-less, it is trivial for an attacker to spoof the source of a DNS
query or response. DNS Cookies, a protocol standardized in 2016, add pseudo-random values
to DNS packets to provide identity management and prevent spoofing attacks. This work
finds that 30% of popular authoritative servers and open recursive resolvers fully support
cookies and that 10% of recursive clients send cookies. Despite this, DNS cookie use is
rarely enforced as it is non-trivial to ascertain whether a given client intends to fully support
cookies. We also show that 80% of clients and 99% of servers do not change their behavior
when encountering a missing or illegitimate cookie.
This paper presents a new protocol to allow cookie enforcement: DNS Protocol
Advertisement Records (DPAR). Advertisement records allow DNS clients intending to
use cookies to post a public record in the reverse DNS zone stating their intent. DNS
servers may then lookup this record and require a client to use cookies as directed, in turn
preventing an attacker from sending spoofed messages without a cookie. In this paper, we
define the specification for DNS Protocol Advertisement Records, considerations that were
made, and comparisons to alternative approaches. We additionally estimate the effectiveness
of advertisements in preventing DDoS attacks and the expected burden to DNS servers.
Advertisement records are designed as the next step to strengthen the existing support of
DNS Cookies by enabling strict enforcement of client cookies.

Keywords: Domain Name System, DNS cookies, internet measurement, cybersecurity, internet
protocols
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The Domain Name System (DNS) has consistently been used for Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks which have the power to disrupt major internet infrastructure.
The DNS remains prevalent for these attacks because it relies on the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP). By the protocol’s design, UDP has no form of a connection and thus no method of
verifying the sender of a packet. This makes it trivial for an attacker to spoof a query to
a DNS server with the victim as the source. Additionally, the DNS has the advantage of
amplification wherein an attacker can send a small spoofed packet, but the victim receives a
packet that is magnitudes larger from the server.
A well-known example of a DDoS attack utilizing the DNS was against Spamhaus,
an anti-spam organization, in 2013. This attack was reported to have generated 300Gbps
[35] and utilized over 30,000 unique DNS resolvers [34]. Queries for this attack achieved an
amplification factor of 100x, meaning the attacker only needed 3Gbps of bandwidth. A more
recent attack occurred in 2016 against Dyn, a major DNS provider. Unlike the Spamhaus
attack, this attack utilized the Mirai botnet to directly send a large volume of traffic, possibly
as high as 1.2Tbps [18]. Many major services were affected, including Amazon, Visa, GitHub,
and Netflix.
Stepping back from DDoS attacks, the DNS is an essential backbone of the internet. Its
primary responsibility is to translate a domain name (e.g., byu.edu) to an Internet Protocol
(IP) address (e.g., 128.187.16.98). The typical model involves a stub resolver (often an
end-device such as a laptop) that sends its query to a recursive resolver. The recursive
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resolver then searches for the answer by contacting authoritative servers in a hierarchical
order. The DNS also supports the distribution of other types of information such as email
policies and cryptographic signatures.
Nearly all DNS packets are sent over UDP as per the original design. As a result,
DDoS attacks will continue because UDP does not provide any form of identity management.
In other words, a DNS server has no means of verifying that the source IP of a packet is
the true sender. This allows an attacker to perform a reflection attack. Since the server
can’t verify who the query came from, it assumes the victim is the true source and sends the
response to them.
To solve this problem, a variety of solutions have been proposed. Some of these employ
techniques such as rate-limiting (e.g., limiting the number of queries from a given client
over a time interval) while others create a challenge-based protocol to verify identity via
knowledge of a secret value. This prevents off-path attacks because the value is only sent
to the victim. DNS Cookies are a prominent challenge system that have reached “proposed
standard” status through the Request for Comments (RFC) system [17].
Cookies, unlike some other proposed solutions, have the advantage of working with
standard DNS implementations because they exist as an option in the Extended DNS (EDNS)
OPT record [11]. With DNS Cookies, a client initially creates and sends a client cookie.
Servers respond with the same client cookie and a cookie generated by the server. In future
communication, client queries include both the client’s own cookie as well as the server cookie
previously received. The server then checks the provided server cookie to authenticate the
client. Additionally, clients can utilize the client cookie to ensure the response came from the
expected server.
In this thesis, we study two questions. First, what is the current support for DNS
Cookies among clients and servers? Second, how can we improve the effectiveness of DNS
Cookies in preventing reflection-based DDoS attacks?

2

In chapter 3 we begin by measuring support for DNS Cookies. We first measure support
for DNS Cookies in high-demand authoritative DNS servers and open resolvers Internet-wide;
we find that 30% of servers fully support cookies, and only 10% of recursive clients send
cookies. We additionally examine the behavior of DNS clients and servers when encountering
missing or illegitimate cookies and find that 80% of clients do not reject responses when they
should and that 99% of servers handle these situations in the least restrictive manner by
responding indifferently. As a result, an attacker could simply send spoofed packets without
a cookie to a server, and the server would respond with the assumption that the client does
not support cookies. It is also not trivial for a server to determine that a client intends to use
cookies. If a server receives cookies from a client, it may actually be a single client behind
a NAT or an attacker sending spoofed packets. The server is unable to enforce cookies in
either case because this would effectively deny service to clients who don’t use cookies.
In chapter 4 we present a method for cookie enforcement where clients can publish a
DNS record, known as an advertisement record, stating that their IP address uses cookies.
This allows a server to perform a lookup and confirm whether a client’s request should have
a cookie before it sends a response. We also look at how effective advertisement records will
be and the necessary effort for successful deployment in chapter 6. A common issue with new
protocols on the internet is that they require high adoption for success, but the burden of
adding support outweighs the incentives. Thus, we look at the theoretical implementation cost
of adding advertisements for both clients and servers. We also discuss what the advertisement
landscape may look like given the current deployment of DNS clients. Finally, in chapter 7,
we discuss some limitations and areas where future work can improve upon our findings.
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Chapter 2
Background

2.1

The Domain Name System

The Domain Name System (DNS) is an essential backbone of the internet. Its primary
responsibility is to translate a domain name (e.g., byu.edu) to an Internet Protocol (IP)
address (e.g., 128.187.16.98), but records containing other data are also used. The standard
architecture for the DNS involves three entities. The stub resolver (often an end-device such
as a laptop), recursive resolver, and a number of independent authoritative servers.
An example of a complete DNS query and answer is shown in Figure 2.1. To begin, a
stub resolver seeks to find the IP address of a domain it wishes to connect to. To resolve the
domain, the stub sends a DNS query to a recursive resolver. The recursive resolver will then
perform a series of lookups to authoritative servers in a hierarchical order. Each authoritative
server either provides the answer or a referral to another server to contact. For example,
the authoritative server for edu will not know the IP address for byu.edu but can direct the
recursive resolver to BYU’s servers which will know. Once the recursive resolver receives an
answer it caches it locally and replies to the stub resolver.
Root Server
Alice’s Stub

Mallory’s Stub

Recursive Resolver
src:

Alice

edu Server
byu Server

Figure 2.1: The basic architecture of the DNS (when Alice queries for byu.edu). An example
of a reflection attack is shown in red.
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Generally, a single recursive resolver will be used by many stub resolvers, often at the
ISP or enterprise network level. This enables more effective caching, and as a result, faster
responses compared to having each device perform its own recursive resolution.

2.1.1

Reverse DNS Zone

While the DNS primarily translates domain names to other resources, the reverse DNS zone is
used to provide records for a given IP address [33]. For IPv4 addresses, a specialized domain
of in-addr.arpa is used for this resolution. The delegation of this domain follows that of
IP addresses in reverse order. For example any records for the IP address 192.0.2.1 can
be found at 1.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. A similar implementation exists for IPv6 using the
ip6.arpa domain.
Reverse records can also exists at standard subnet boundaries. For example, a /16
subnet starting at 10.4.0.0 consists of all IPs from 10.4.0.0-10.4.255.255. The reverse
DNS record for this subnet would exist at 4.10.in-addr.arpa. Other subnet boundaries
are /8 (one octet of an IP defined), /24 (three octets defined), and a /32 (a single IP).
This provides a mechanism to associate IP addresses with domain names. A common
use of the reverse DNS is for identification. One example is verifying that an IP sending
an email has a record showing the same domain as the email address and that the domain
resolves to the IP. This prevents an attacker from forging an email from a different network.

2.1.2

Transport Protocols

DNS messages are a part of the application layer in the OSI network model. This means
that DNS messages are agnostic to the transport mechanism used. However, a vast majority
of DNS messages are sent using the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for transport. UDP
is generally preferred due to its speed and well-established support by DNS servers. DNS
messages can also officially be sent using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [14],
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [20], and HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) [19]
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standards. While TLS and HTTPS have begun seeing adoption [12], nearly all messages
continue to be sent over UDP.
A major drawback of UDP is its lack of identity management. Unlike TCP (and TLS
and HTTPS which extend TCP), UDP does not establish a connection prior to exchanging
data. As a result, neither a client or server can guarantee that a message they receive is
actually from the source IP given.

2.2

Spoofing Attacks

UDP does not provide identity management and therefore does not protect against spoofing
attacks, wherein an attacker impersonates a client or server by using their IP address as the
source.
One attack that utilizes spoofing to impersonate an authoritative server is DNS cache
poisoning. With cache poisoning, an attacker can respond to a client with a malicious IP
address, causing that client, and all who rely on its cache, to be redirected to the malicious
IP.
Due to the severity of a successful cache poisoning attack, several measures have been
encouraged to reduce the chance of a successful cache poisoning. These include source port
randomization [21] and 0x20 encoding (randomized capitalization) [8]—both of which require
only changes to client-side software. Another avenue would be for a client to use DNS-overTCP [14], DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [20], or DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [19]. These three protocols
all provide the identity management inherent in the TCP handshake, and DoT and DoH are
showing increased adoption [12, 31]. However, they result in increased latency [9]. A final
approach, which avoids identity management altogether, is cryptographically authenticating
DNS responses. This strategy is employed by DNSCurve [7] and the DNS Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) [4–6]. Neither of these methods has seen widespread adoption.
Another attack that exploits the lack of identity management in UDP and the DNS is
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Here the attacker impersonates the victim’s
6

client and sends many DNS queries to recursive or authoritative DNS servers. This results
in traffic being reflected off of DNS servers and the victim being flooded with unsolicited
response traffic. Past attacks have reached traffic volumes of 300Gbps and are capable of
affecting major services such as Amazon and Netflix [34]. These attacks are often referred to
as reflection attacks because the malicious traffic is reflected off an unknowing DNS server.
An example of reflection is shown in Figure 2.1.
Both of these attacks can have major effects but can be prevented with some form of
identity management.

2.3

DNS Cookie Protocol

DNS Cookies [17] are designed as a lightweight mechanism that provides identity management
at a strength similar to TCP but without the latency burden. They are included in DNS
messages as an option inside the Extended DNS (EDNS) OPT resource record [11]. Both the
client and server in a given communication can provide a plain-text cookie in their DNS
messages. They can then verify that the other party includes the provided cookie in future
communication to ensure that messages have not been spoofed by an off-path attacker. An
example of this process is shown in Figure 2.2. DNS Cookies do not provide protection
against on-path attackers, but should still provide substantial benefit to securing the internet
as a whole.
Client cookies are 8 bytes in length and are used to prevent cache poisoning by enabling
the client to verify the server’s identity. A stub or recursive resolver can include a DNS client
cookie in their queries and only accept a response containing the cookie. The suggested
implementation for generating a client cookie is to use a cryptographic hash of the (Client
IP |Server IP |Client Secret). More recent suggestions remove the inclusion of the Client
IP as it may not be known at the time of generation [37]. Regardless, a client should use
a unique cookie per server and should not reuse a cookie across IP addresses as this would
enable tracking the client.
7

Client
query + client_cookie(0xab...)

Server
response + client_cookie(0xab...) + server_cookie(0x12...)

Verify Client
Cookie Matches
query + client_cookie(0xab...) + server_cookie(0x12...)
Verify Server
response + client_cookie(0xab...) + server_cookie(0x34...)

Cookie Matches

http://msc-generator.sourceforge.net v6.3.5

Figure 2.2: An example communication using DNS Cookies. Here the client starts from a
fresh state and reuses its cookie whereas the server generates a new cookie per query.
A server cookie ranges in size from 8 to 32 bytes and is used to confirm a client’s
identity, in turn preventing reflection-based attacks. Authoritative and recursive servers

may choose to send a server cookie when responding to a query with a client cookie in it.
Clients should then include this cookie in future queries to verify their identity. If a server
receives a query without a valid server cookie they may enforce cookie use by responding
with the BADCOOKIE response code (rcode), a valid server cookie, and no DNS answers. The
specification suggests that a server cookie consists of a 4-byte nonce, 4-byte timestamp, and
an 8-byte cryptographic hash of the (Server Secret |Client Cookie |Nonce |Time |Client IP).
The time field results in a new cookie for every request and makes rejection of outdated
cookies easy. Additionally, the server does not need to save any state to verify a cookie as
the nonce and timestamp are provided in plain-text.

8

2.4
2.4.1

Related Work
DDoS Mitigation

A large body of research has been conducted to determine a method to prevent distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Mitigation methods typically fall into one of two categories:
filters and challenges. Each method poses its own benefits and limitations.
In [16], Du and Nakao present the Network Egress and Ingress Filter (NEIF). NEIF
is designed to filter flows at ISP edge routers through the use of bloom filters. A major
drawback of this design is that it requires ISP involvement. An owner of a server may wish to
protect themselves but would be unable to without ISP support. In [22], Huong and Thanh
present a solution using a software-defined network (SDN) to identify and stop malicious flows
before they reach internal servers. The primary issue with this method, and most filters in
general, is that it simply shifts the bottleneck. If the filtering infrastructure is not sufficiently
provisioned, it too can be brought down by an attack, effectively blocking the victim.
Challenge-based methods rely on clients verifying their identity by providing a unique
token given to them by the server. DNS Cookies follow this pattern, as do many other
proposed ideas. In [1], Al-Dalky et al. propose a challenge-response protocol that uses
CNAME records (thus operable with most existing implementations). In particular, this
protocol is designed to have authoritative servers not forward DDoS attacks, and it takes
into consideration the practice of having pools of resolvers querying. The paper notes that
DNS Cookies may be an effective strategy, but they require support from both the client
and the server. In [38], Zhenga et al. present the Cookie-based Amplification Repression
Protocol (CARP). CARP is designed as a replacement to UDP and initiates a challenge
system for suspicious traffic. As the challenge packets are small, amplification is effectively
nullified. Given that this method replaces UDP, a well-established protocol, it is unlikely to
see adoption. Finally, in [39], Zhu et al. propose T-DNS, a connection-based protocol that
uses TLS. This has since evolved into DNS over TLS (DoT), a recent RFC [20]. Like DNS
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Cookies this has the potential to mitigate DDoS attacks, but it also requires enforcement
to be effective. Otherwise, an attacker could still spoof UDP packets to flood a DoT-using
victim.

2.4.2

Internet Measurement

There has also been a variety of internet measurement work relating to the DNS, but nothing
on DNS Cookies.1 In [28], Kührer et al. studied open resolvers in the wild. They were able
to contact over 25 million resolvers during the beginning of their study. This has important
implications as all of these resolvers have the potential to be used for DDoS attacks. Jonker
et al. [25] studied the adoption of DDoS protection services. These services typically work by
using a large network infrastructure as a reverse proxy. The paper finds steady growth in the
usage of these services.
Finally, Al-Dalky et al. study the adoption of EDNS client subnet (ECS) at resolvers
in [2]. ECS is used to share a stub’s IP address with authoritative servers for better routing.
Like DNS Cookies, ECS exists as an EDNS option and both were proposed as RFCs in
2016. They find a variety of pitfalls in existing implementations that inhibit privacy and the
usefulness of ECS.

1
Preliminary work for this paper resulted in a publication measuring DNS Cookie adoption. The relevant
findings from that publication are presented in chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Existing Cookie Support

As preliminary work for designing a protocol to enforce cookies, we first performed
research to measure the current support of cookies. We additionally analyzed how clients
and servers responded to missing or illegitimate cookies. Since there exists no mechanism to
enforce cookies, most DNS software accepts any cookie (or lack thereof).
For this analysis, we classify varying levels of support: EDNS capability (via the
inclusion of an option (OPT) record in a response), echoing of a sent client cookie (only), and
full support with a returned server cookie. While echoing a client cookie is not a specified
option in the protocol, doing so still protects the client from cache poisoning attacks by
allowing the client to verify the server’s inclusion of its cookie. We also measure cookie usage
of recursive resolvers in the “client” role in connection with queries to authoritative servers
under our control.

3.1

Server-Side Cookie Support

We queried a set of open recursive resolvers and two sets of authoritative servers to measure
DNS Cookie support for “servers”.
To generate a set of recursive resolvers to test, we issued a DNS query (for a domain
we control) to every IPv4 address. We classified an IP address as a recursive resolver if it
1) queried our authoritative server or 2) responded to our query with the recursion available
(RA) flag set and a response code of either NOERROR or NXDOMAIN. This data was collected from
September 24–26, 2020. In total, we identified 1,908,397 open recursive resolvers. We note
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that we are unable to measure cookie support in private resolvers as we have no mechanism
to query them. However, private servers cannot be queried by attacks either and are therefore
unable to be used in reflection attacks. As a result, it is unnecessary for a private resolver to
support cookies on its server-side.
For authoritative servers, we analyzed servers authoritative for the top 1 million Alexa
domains [3] (actually 770,631 domains) and servers authoritative for the 1,509 top-level
domains (TLDs) [23] (including the root servers). All data was collected on September 30,
2020, using the latest Alexa file and root zone available. The names and IP addresses (IPv4
and IPv6) for each domain in the collective lists were determined through 1) a lookup of type
NS (name server) for the domain and 2) a lookup of type A and AAAA (IPv4 and IPv6 address,
respectively) for each name returned in the NS query response. In total, we recorded 157,679
IP addresses for the Alexa sites and 6,615 for the TLDs.
To identify support for cookies, we issued up to 6 DNS queries to each server—stopping
early if we received a response with a server cookie. We included the same client cookie
in every query. During these queries, we experienced errors with 48% of resolvers, likely
due to high churn (meaning that many resolvers were no longer accessible due to dynamic
IP addresses, changes in configurations, etc.). In particular, queries for 32% of resolvers
timed out, and for 16% of resolvers, we received a response from a different IP address (often
Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1) than we had queried. Removing these cases leaves us with 999,228
error-free resolvers. For authoritative servers, queries to 6,724 (4.3%) of Alexa IPs resulted
in an error, as did queries to 58 (0.88%) TLD IPs. The errors associated with querying
authoritative servers primarily consisted of time-outs (98% of Alexa errors and 100% of TLD
errors), though there were a handful of malformed packets or unexpected responses. We
report all of our results as percentages of communications with error-free servers.
EDNS, which is a prerequisite for cookies, was supported (as evidenced by an OPT
record in responses) by 699,402 (70%) of recursive resolvers, 147,878 (98%) of Alexa IPs,
and 6,557 (100%) of TLD IPs. The client cookie that we sent in our queries was returned
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by 208,526 (21%) of recursive resolvers, 48,262 (32%) of Alexa IPs, and only 1,249 (19%) of
TLD IPs. The remaining servers returned a response that either did not include a COOKIE
EDNS option or included a client cookie that did not match the one we sent. Servers that
included a server cookie in their response (this implies the inclusion of a client cookie, by
specification) include: 167,402 (17%) of open resolvers, 43,649 (29%) of Alexa IPs, and all
1,249 of the TLD IPs that returned the correct client cookie.
Overall we observe high EDNS support (70% of resolvers and >98% of authoritative
servers). However, cookie support is much lower. While nearly one-third of Alexa IPs fully
supported cookies, less than 20% of TLD IPs and recursive resolvers did. As a result, there
are still more than 100,000 authoritative servers and 800,000 recursive resolvers which can be
used for reflection attacks because they lack a mechanism for validating client identity.
We additionally saw a number of errors in both the server and client cookies we received.
For server cookies, 14 resolver IPs and 5 Alexa IPs returned a cookie of all zeroes. The Alexa
and TLD IPs that returned server cookies were collectively authoritative for 26,629 domains
and 373 zones respectively. For client cookies, 93 Alexa IPs and 41 resolvers IPs responded
with a cookie that did not match the one we sent. For 5 Alexa IPs and 22 resolvers IPs, the
value of the client cookie returned was off by only one byte—the fourth most significant byte.
An additional 5 Alexa and 14 resolver IPs replied with zeroed-out client cookies. A single
TLD IP, one of three servers authoritative for the gm TLD, returned a COOKIE option with
all zeroes for both the client and server cookies. The remaining unexpected responses did not
follow a discernible pattern.

3.2

Client-Side Cookie Support in Recursive Resolvers

During our measurements of resolvers supporting the “server” role of cookies, we also measured
their support for DNS Cookies while acting as a “client”. Each query we issued consisted of
a special domain name hosted at authoritative servers under our control. We recorded each
incoming query for the domain name we were using and responded with NXDOMAIN and full
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Figure 3.1: Incremental support for DNS Cookies across the three datasets of recursive
resolvers, TLD authoritative servers, and the top 1m Alexa authoritative servers. Servers in
the leftmost group fully support DNS Cookies (meaning they sent a server cookie, echoed
the client cookie, and sent EDNS).
DNS Cookie support. We observed queries to our authoritative servers from 93,395 unique IP
addresses, of which 8,471 (9.1%) sent at least one response that contained a COOKIE option.
During this measurement, we encoded the IP address of the recursive resolver that
we queried in the domain name. This reveals that 1,552,397 unique resolvers queried our
backend through the 90,000 IP addresses. This discrepancy may be due to forwarding, as 56%
of resolvers were represented by only 1000 IP addresses. In particular, Google and Cloudflare
handled queries for 36% and 7.0% of resolvers respectively.
In our measurement for recursive resolvers sending cookies, we found client cookie
support to be minimal. Of resolvers that queried our authoritative servers directly, only 9.1%
of over 90,000 IPs sent a cookie. This is potentially alarming as these resolvers are not using
cookies for cache poisoning protection. While they may employ other methods, DNS Cookies
offer an extra layer of defense.

3.3

The State of Cookie Enforcement

In this section, we explore how clients and servers handle unexpected behavior. We begin
by demonstrating to clients and servers that our infrastructure supports cookies. We then
perform tests with missing cookies, missing EDNS, or fake cookies. With this, we can see
whether clients and servers will enforce cookies if they know the other party supports them.
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If not, cookies provide little value as an attacker could simply exclude cookies in their spoofed
packets.

3.3.1

Client Handling of Unexpected Server Behavior

For this experiment, we forced the 1.5 million resolvers (with or without cookie support) found
in section 3.2 to query our authoritative servers 6 times. We configured our authoritative
server to respond differently depending on the query name it received. The response conditions
we created are as follows (in order):
1. normal: Respond with full cookie support: Correct client cookie and a server cookie—if
the query included a client cookie.
2. no-cookie: Respond with no COOKIE option.
3. bad-answer: Respond with the correct client cookie (if any), BADCOOKIE rcode, and
an answer section.
4. bad: Respond with the correct client cookie (if any), BADCOOKIE rcode, and no answer
section.
5. no-edns: Respond with no OPT record (i.e., no EDNS support).
6. fake: Respond with incorrect client cookie.
For each query, we made up to 3 attempts, as the stub resolver, to receive an answer.
This experiment was run approximately one week after we discovered the 1.5 million IPs. As
a result, we experienced a high churn and only saw 528,832 (34%) of IPs respond with both
an answer and an rcode of NOERROR in our normal condition.1
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Condition
normal
no-cookie
no-edns
fake

Normal
28,605
23,979 (84%)
24,798 (87%)
5,115 (20%)

Response
SERVFAIL
3,625 (13%)
2,495 (8.7%)
10,059 (40%)

Timeout
909 (3.2%)
1,236 (4.3%)
9,564 (38%)

Table 3.1: Overview of client responses to missing and fake client cookies.
Responses with Missing/Invalid Client Cookies
An overview of client responses can be found in Table 3.1. Of those resolvers from which
we still received responses, 28,605 (5.4%) included a cookie in the normal condition (or
the intermediate IP did). For these IPs in the no-cookie scenario, we surprisingly got a
normal response from 23,979 (84%) IPs. Of those with bad responses, 3,625 (13%) had a
SERVFAIL rcode and an additional 909 (3.2%) timed out. For the no-edns queries, we saw
similar numbers compared to those who sent cookies: 24,798 (87%) responded to our stub
resolver normally, 2,495 (8.7%) responded with SERVFAIL, and 1,236 (4.3%) timed out.
Finally, in the fake category, we began to see more rejection. This test was performed
a day after no-edns and as a result, there was more churn and some servers may have stopped
sending EDNS since we appeared to not support it. We recorded 27,079 IPs which sent a
cookie in a normal query directly preceding this test. We saw a much lower percentage of
acceptance here with only 5,115 (20%) responding to the stub resolver normally. Most failure
is split between SERVFAIL with 10,059 (40%) of IPs and time-outs with 9,564 (38%) of IPs.
The specification for DNS Cookies states that a client must discard a response with
an invalid client cookie or a missing cookie when one is expected. However, we observed
that 20% of recursive clients did not reject invalid cookies and that over 80% of clients did
not discard responses that were missing a cookie when one should have been present (as
demonstrated to the client in a previous query). This means that a majority of recursive
clients may still be susceptible to cache poisoning attacks because a response without EDNS
1
We did not rerun the initial collection as the process is resource intensive and takes multiple days. We
are also less interested in servers lost due to churn as they are unlikely to be true open resolvers as opposed
to misconfigurations.
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or a DNS COOKIE option is accepted as easily as a legitimate response with a valid client
cookie.

Responses with BADCOOKIE Rcode
Two of our conditions tested how a recursive resolver responds to a BADCOOKIE rcode. In
one condition we still included the answer, but in the other, we did not. This imitates an
authoritative server strictly requiring cookies (though a correctly behaving serving would
provide a valid server cookie and accept it in future queries). For these conditions, we consider
all 528,832 servers who successfully answered the normal condition regardless of cookie use.
For the bad queries, 301,929 (57%) of IPs timed out and 206,577 (39%) returned an
rcode of SERVFAIL. We observed similar values for bad-answer: 272,041 (51%) timed out
and 236,401 (45%) returned SERVFAIL. We did observe an extra effort by recursive resolvers
receiving either a bad or a bad-answer response to get a valid response. More than half
of IP addresses issued at least 19 queries in connection with either of these responses—as
opposed to a median of 1 for normal queries. Interestingly, 17,921 (3.4%) of recursive
resolvers that responded to our bad-answer query returned to us the answer that our
servers had given to them, despite the BADCOOKIE rcode in the response from our authoritative
servers. Of those that returned an answer, 14,350 (80%) also set the rcode to SERVFAIL. The
lack of enforcement is accompanied by a lack of consensus on how unexpected responses
should be handled.

3.3.2

Server Handling of Unexpected Client Behavior

Here we performed a short test to determine how DNS servers would respond to unexpected
client behavior, with regard to the server cookie sent by the client. Specifically, we had our
client send 5 queries that included the most recently received server cookie, 5 queries without
a server cookie, and 5 queries with a fake server cookie. In each of these conditions, the client
cookie was sent as normal. In the latter two cases, the specification provides three options for
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a server [17]. They may silently discard the request, respond with the BADCOOKIE error code,
or respond normally as if no cookie option was present. We sent these queries to all Alexa
IPs, TLD IPs, and recursive resolver IPs identified in section 3.1 that supported cookies.
For Alexa servers, we observed 41,083 IPs that responded to at least one normal query
with a valid response and rcode of NOERROR. In our two other scenarios, nearly all of these
IPs also had one or more standard responses: >99% for queries without cookies and with
fake cookies. We observed 1 IP that used the BADCOOKIE rcode even when we sent the most
recently received server cookie. We saw only 28 IPs use BADCOOKIE when we didn’t send a
cookie and 27 IPs when we sent a fake cookie.
For TLD servers, we initially observed 1,246 IPs that responded to at least one normal
query with an rcode of NOERROR. All but 3 IPs returned an rcode of NOERROR in both the
fake and missing cookie scenarios. These 3 IPs consistently returned an rcode of BADCOOKIE
under these conditions, and all were authoritative for the il (Israel) TLD.
For recursive resolvers, we saw 137,896 IPs return an rcode of NXDOMAIN (we queried
for a non-existent domain) for a normal query. Again we saw over 99% continue to behave
normally when the server cookie was missing or fake. We measured 49 servers using BADCOOKIE
for a missing cookie and 53 for a fake cookie (though 13 IPs sent BADCOOKIE incorrectly in
the normal condition).
In summary, practically no server changes its behavior if it doesn’t receive a server
cookie or if it receives a fake one (even after the client previously sent valid cookies). While
this behavior is consistent with the specification, it is the least restrictive approach. As
a result, these servers can still potentially be used in reflection attacks because they will
generate a full response regardless of the server cookie.
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Chapter 4
DNS Protocol Advertisement Record Specification

We have seen that DNS cookies are seeing adoption, but that no mechanism exists for
enforcing their use. As a result, most clients and servers that use cookies remain susceptible
to spoofing attacks.
Here we present a new protocol: DNS Protocol Advertisement Record (DPAR).
Protocol advertisements are designed to allow servers to enforce that a given client use cookies
(or another protocol) if that client has advertised support. With proper adoption, this would
prevent reflection-based attacks since a server would know not to answer a cookie-less query.

4.1

Protocol Overview

The advertisement protocol is designed to allow clients to protect themselves from reflectionbased DDoS attacks. Clients are able to publish a record stating their use of cookies (or
other mechanisms), allowing servers to drop incoming queries that are non-compliant with
the advertisement.

4.1.1

Threat Model

Advertisement records are intended to protect ranges of IP addresses from being spoofed in
reflection-based DDoS attacks. This greatly benefits those publishing the record, as DDoS
volumes will be greatly reduced. Advertisement records are explicitly designed for instances
where a large number of servers are being used for reflection. The victim does not need to
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take any action other than publishing the advertisement in advance. All potential reflectors
are then able to identify the victim’s policy and enforce it in a quick manner.
The primary beneficiary of this protocol is the potential victim. Advertisement records
provide marginal benefits to servers by allowing them to drop attack packets early. However,
under the attack considered, servers do not typically experience an amount of traffic beyond
what they are capable of handling due to the distributed nature of the attack.
Since advertisement records are about server-side authentication of DNS clients, it does
not provide additional protection from cache poisoning attacks; however, other methods, such
as 0x20 encoding and source port randomization have addressed client-side authentication of
DNS servers. Further investigation of client-side authentication is outside the scope of this
protocol.

4.1.2

Client-Server Architecture

DNS Cookies operate on a client-server model. Two such instances exist in the DNS: stub
to recursive resolver and recursive resolver to authoritative server. Advertisement records
work in a similar two-party fashion. “Clients” advertise their policy while servers (both
authoritative and recursive) enforce the policies.
The advertisement protocol protects not only DNS clients but entire ranges of IP
addresses. A record applies a policy to an entire subnet, preventing a spoofing attack against
any IP in the range. As a result, any owner of IP space can benefit from the use of an
advertisement, regardless of whether or not they maintain DNS clients. If they do not have
any DNS clients, a none policy can be applied. In instances where a subnet contains only a
single DNS client, the policy should match the client’s behavior, but will additionally apply
to other IP addresses in the subnet.
Advertisement records must be enforced by servers. Here the design maintains the
traditional definition of a DNS server. Both recursive resolvers and authoritative servers
should implement the protocol; otherwise, an attacker could simply use the other set of
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servers for an attack. Servers will be required to perform a lookup for advertisement records.
While this is trivial for a recursive resolver (which acts as a client and server), it may require
more significant changes for authoritative servers. One option may be for the authoritative
server to work in tandem with a stub or recursive client that can retrieve records.
While the cost of implementation for authoritative servers is high, we expect that
those who publish an advertisement record will implement enforcement on any server they
control. Servers should also consider adopting the protocol in order to benefit the community
as a whole.

4.2

Protocol Specification

Any network can advertise the use of a specific DNS protocol by including a record in
their reverse DNS zone at the /16 subnet level (e.g., at 2.0.192.in-addr.arpa for the IP
192.0.2.1). If a single advertisement record does not apply to the entire subnet, delegations
can be made for exceptions at individual /24 subnets.
A server (recursive or authoritative) supporting advertisements will perform a reverse
lookup for an incoming DNS query from a new IP address. If an advertisement is found
at the /16 (or at a delegated /24), the server enforces the policy by limiting responses to
queries that do not conform with the policy. If an advertisement is not found at the /16, the
server caches the lack of a policy and proceeds to behave like normal for the IP.
This effectively prevents a victim IP, who is advertising a secure protocol (e.g., DNS
cookies or TCP), from being attacked via reflection; all servers can check the policy and
ignore any spoofed packets they see.

4.2.1

Advertisement Record

An advertisement record must exist at the /16 subnet level and can optionally delegate down
to the /24 level as is shown in Figure 4.1. The record is of type text (TXT). The text record
has the following format:
21

Listing 4.1: DNS Protocol Advertisement record format.
dns_proto_adv={udp|cookie|tcp|none}[ delegate=(64-char-hex-field)]

The advertisement allows only a single value. This value represents the minimum level
of security the subnet intends to use when sending queries. The options above are sorted
by their level of security. For example, a dns proto adv=cookie record would allow cookies
and TCP connections, but not UDP. While the focus of this paper is on enforcing cookie use,
the advertisement can be easily extended to other transport mechanisms. We include TCP
here and expect future extensions such as DNS-over-TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS. Each option
is further described here:
• udp: The subnet sends queries using standard UDP. This option exists as a formality
and is the default level when no advertisement record exists. Clients may explicitly
state that any mechanism is valid through the use of this record.
• cookie: The subnet’s queries will contain cookies at a minimum.
• tcp: The subnet will send all queries over TCP (or a higher security protocol if added).
• none: This subnet does not send DNS queries; thus, any queries from this subnet can
be considered illegitimate. This option allows clients to explicitly state that any DNS
queries appearing to originate from the subnet should be dropped.
• delegate: Valid only at the /16 level. This parameter may optionally be added to
a record in instances where the policies for some /24s differ from the /16 policy. It
contains a 64-character hex string which is interpreted as a bit field. A value of 0 means
to use the policy of the /16 while 1 means that the policy is delegated to the /24.
The bit field is 0-indexed and read from left to right (e.g., the 6th subnet’s value is at
position 7). Delegation at other subnet boundaries should be achieved using multiple
records or delegations (see section 6.1).
Clients may choose the time-to-live (TTL) of the record as they would for any other
DNS record. The recommended range of TTLs is 3–48 hours. Clients may prefer a shorter
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in-addr
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dns proto adv=none
delegate=0200...
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dns proto adv=cookie

...
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5
... ...
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dns proto adv=tcp
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Figure 4.1: Example of advertisement records in the reverse DNS for two /16 subnets
(10.4.0.0 and 10.5.0.0) and a delegated /24 (10.4.6.0). Colors show which subnets are
covered by the given policy.
TTL such that they are not locked out by servers in the case of a misconfiguration. It is
important to note that servers may continue to use an expired advertisement record for longer
if incoming queries do not break the specified policy. This further allows a client to select a
low TTL value without burdening servers.
4.2.2

Example Record

Here we show an example of what the full records may look like at a /16 and /24. These
records match the example shown in Figure 4.1.
Listing 4.2: Example Advertisement Records for a /16 and /24.
dns_proto_adv=none delegate=021094cf9546e8a240511d946bc9d0400998800f4b11084881
a80848612645f1
dns_proto_adv=cookie

The delegation string allows a server to determine which /24s have a delegated record.
Treating the hex value as a bit-field and indexing into a given position determines how to
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Figure 4.2: High-level overview of server enforcement process. If the server experiences a
cache miss, it may respond normally to a predetermined amount of queries.
handle that subnet. For example, if the above record was for 10.4.0.0 and a query arrives
at a server from 10.4.6.3, the server should check the 7th position (using 0-indexing) in the
delegation field. If it is a 1, the server performs a lookup for the /24 (6.4.10.in-addr.arpa),
if the value is 0 the server uses the /16 policy of none.
4.2.3

Server Behavior

Figure 4.2 provides an overview of a server’s behavior. Upon receiving a DNS query, a server
should check for an existing advertisement record in its cache for the appropriate /16 (and
the /24 if a cached /16 record specifies delegation for the given /24). If a cached record exists
and is not expired, the server must enforce the provided policy. If an expired cache record
exists, the server need not refresh its cache if the incoming query conforms to the policy,
and the record has been expired for no more than a given factor of the record’s TTL. It is
necessary to occasionally recheck expired records to ensure that a client has not upgraded to
a more secure policy.
If a cached record does not exist in any capacity, a server must perform an advertisement
lookup; however, this lookup does not need to be performed prior to responding to the incoming
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query. A server may define a maximum number of queries to respond to from a new client
before an advertisement record is retrieved. This allows for the server to optimize its load
without sending a significant amount of traffic to the potential victim.
If the server finds an advertisement record, it caches it per normal DNS operations. If
the record requires delegation, the server performs an additional lookup for the /24 and caches
that. If a record does not exist at the /16 level, the server should perform negative caching to
prevent repeat lookups. A negative cache record is the equivalent of a udp advertisement value.
Negative cache entries should have a reasonable TTL and must not be used when expired.
This allows for clients to add an advertisement record quickly and to have it distributed to
all servers in a short time frame.
When a server is enforcing an advertisement policy and receives a number of noncompliant queries, it should drop the queries. This prevents any attack packets from being
reflected to the client. However, an exception must be made for enforcing a cookie policy. If
incoming queries include a client cookie, but no server cookie, the server must respond to a
portion of queries with a valid server cookie (and optionally the answer to the query). This
ensures that a legitimate client is able to obtain a valid server cookie. However, the server
must ensure that the total volume of its responses does not exceed the volume of incoming
queries. Otherwise, the server could still be used effectively in a reflection attack.
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Chapter 5
Design Considerations

5.1

Backward Compatibility

Our protocol is designed to ensure backward compatibility with both clients and servers. In
instances where a client publishes an advertisement record but a server does not support
enforcement, operations proceed normally. A client’s advertisement record does not affect
an unsupported server as the server will simply not query for the record. In the opposite
scenario, where a server support enforcement but the client has no record, the server will
treat the client as having a udp policy. This policy is the least restrictive and enables the
server to handle clients without an advertisement easily.

5.2

Support for IPv6

The protocol was primarily designed for IPv4; however, to be effective, IPv6 must also be
supported. The record is unchanged for IPv6; however, the location of records (e.g., which
subnet level) would need to be changed. We leave this to future work. Regardless of the
record location, IPv6 will result in far more potential records for a server to cache due to the
inherent size of the address space.

5.3

Similarities to SPF and DMARC Records

DNS Protocol Advertisement Records (DPARs) share similarities to other mechanisms used
for identity management in emails. In particular, the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [26]
is a mechanism that allows domains to publish a policy indicating which IP addresses can
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legitimately send email messages claiming to be from the domain. For example, the domain
example.com may publish an SPF record stating that all emails from the domain will originate
from 192.0.2.1. When a mail server receives an email from that domain, it can look up the
SPF policy and verify that the sender’s IP address is among those allowed to send for the
domain. This prevents an attacker from using the protected domain in the “from” address of
an email, sending it from an illegitimate IP address, and having it perceived as legitimate.
While SPF provides a mechanism for domains to specify IPs authorized to send emails
from the domain, SPF does not dictate what a mail server should do when an SPF policy
fails. Another protocol, Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance
(DMARC) [27], adds a DNS record to enable this. With DMARC, domains publish a record
instructing a mail server what to do if an SPF policy fails or if the mail is not signed with the
correct DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [10] key. Domains may instruct servers to treat
the spoofed email normally, quarantine it, or reject it. Additionally, DMARC has options to
report the spoofed email back to the domain owner.
All three protocols (DPAR, SPF, and DMARC) have a similar goal of providing
identity management through DNS records. As a server will query for these records on its
own, an off-path attacker is unable to influence or intercept the mechanism. The existence of
these records means that the record owner is expecting specific behavior from external mail
or DNS servers. Additionally, the three protocols share a number of features with their policy
options. All three have a default policy which is equivalent to there being no record: udp
for advertisements records, ?all for SPF, and p=none for DMARC. These policies provide
backward compatibility and ensure a server appropriately handles a lack of a record. Both
DPAR and SPF also have a policy for dropping everything claiming to originate from the
subnet or domain: none for DPAR and -all for SPF. These catch-all statements allow a
subnet with no DNS clients or a domain with no email addresses to protect themselves from
impersonation.
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A major area where DPAR differs from SPF and DMARC is that advertisement
records exist in the reverse DNS as opposed to the standard (forward) DNS. This is necessary
because an incoming query contains no domain information, whereas an email will contain
a domain name. Another difference is that if a DPAR policy does not pass (i.e., a weaker
protocol than stated was used) the server must drop the packet. This differs from SPF and
DMARC which separate the validation and enforcement policies. Finally, SPF and DMARC
allow for more complex policies, such as “softfails”, the ability to include policies from outside
domains, and reporting mechanisms.

5.4

Allowing Use of Stale Records

One aspect of our protocol that breaks typical DNS implementations is the allowance of
servers to use cached advertisement records that are stale (i.e., expired). There exists some
precedent for using expired records. Specifically, a method known as serve-stale has been
created for recursive resolvers to use expired records if they are not able to contact the
authoritative server [30].
Using stale advertisement records (when all queries comply with the record) allows a
server to reduce its overall workload. However, a server is not required to use stale records.
They may instead follow the standard implementation of looking up the record after expiration.
We leave it up to the maintainers (and users) of DNS server software to decide whether they
would like to implement this feature.
A server using stale records must still re-query for records on occasion. We suggest
a period of 4x the base TTL as this provides some configurability to the maintainer of the
record. Checking records is necessary to ensure that a client has not upgraded to a more
secure policy. For example, a client may change from cookie to tcp. TCP queries are still
compliant with a cookie policy and would not instigate a lookup for an expired cookie policy
otherwise.
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5.5

Authoritative Servers Performing Queries

This protocol requires authoritative servers to make outgoing queries in order to determine
the advertisement policy of an incoming IP address. We acknowledge that this behavior is
non-standard for authoritative servers since they do not have a client-side component like
recursive resolvers. We suggest that an authoritative server utilize the stub resolver found on
its system and preferably a local recursive resolver. Overall, it is important that a large and
quickly accessible cache is maintained.

5.6

Shortcoming of Alternative Designs

While designing this protocol, we explored several alternative options. We provide an overview
of a handful of some of these options below and why they ultimately were not chosen.

5.6.1

Records at any subnet

One option considered was to allow the advertisement record at any subnet boundary (/8,
/16, /24, /32). This provides far more flexibility and granularity for advertisers but increases
the workload for servers. A server would need to check each subnet for a given IP to see if
a record exists. Negative caching of an entire subnet would also be impossible because the
lack of a record at a /16 does not prevent a record from existing at the /24 or /32. Negative
caching was considered essential in our design because a vast majority of IPs do not support
cookies, and requiring a lookup for each new IP would be burdensome. This claim is further
addressed in section 6.4.

5.6.2

Distributed Sharing between Servers

Under this protocol, clients would not advertise cookie use. Instead, servers would collect
data about whether a client uses cookies and then combine that data with other servers to
form a stronger assumption of support. This idea would not work because an attacker could
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spoof packets without a cookie to trick servers into being unsure if the client support cookies.
This is true of any design which tries to infer client behavior. Instead, a client must be able
to explicitly share a record.

5.6.3

Advertising Support within Queries

A final option would be to have clients advertise support for cookies via an additional EDNS
option. Spoofing attacks could be prevented by only accepting the option if a valid cookie (or
TCP) is also used. This method would not work because, in a typical DDoS attack, hundreds
of servers will be utilized. A typical client will not have contacted most of these servers and
thus would be unable to advertise cookie use to them. It is therefore imperative that a server
is able to find a client’s advertisement policy without ever having received contact from the
client before.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation

6.1

Administrative Feasibility of Records

One of the most substantial constraints we imposed on this protocol was the requirement
that an advertisement record exists at the /16. It was important to require the record at a
specific level so that servers would not have to search for the record across multiple subnet
boundaries. It also allows servers to immediately add a negative cache entry after one query.
The decision to use a /16 was made to balance between the total number of records a
server may need and the distribution of entities within a given subnet. A /16 results in a
maximum of 65,536 records that a server may need to know the advertisements for every IP
(barring any delegation).
Here we estimate the administrative feasibility of advertisement records by analyzing
the number of organizations announcing IP prefixes (i.e., ranges of IP addresses) within a
subnet. We analyzed the distribution of Autonomous System (AS) prefixes for the IPv4
address space. An AS represents an organization that announces one or more IP prefixes.
These prefixes may be any size and do not necessarily correspond to the octet boundaries
(/16 and /24) where advertisement records are placed. We expect that a given organization
wanting to advertise protocol support would enable it for an entire prefix (or delegate to
subsections within the prefix). The data mapping IP prefixes to ASs was gathered on January
20, 2021, from iptoasn.com [13].
We found that 8.4 prefixes were announced by various ASs, on average, for a /16
subnet. In other words, for a /16 subnet (e.g., 10.0.0.0/16) there were, on average, 8.4 AS

31

prefixes which were “inside” the /16 (e.g., 10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255, 10.0.1.0-10.0.1.255,
etc.). We find this reasonable from an administrative perspective. If one AS desired to support
advertisements in its prefix (which is a subset of the /16 subnet), it should be manageable
to add a record at the /16 and either delegate to the individual AS or convince other AS
prefixes to adopt the record. For comparison, there was an average of 700 announced prefixes
for a /8 subnet, a number that is far too large to coordinate.
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of sizes for autonomous systems prefixes. There are
many instances where a prefix is not a power of two subnet (e.g., a /15 or /20). We believe
these cases are manageable through the use of multiple records. For example, of the 1,995
prefixes that are larger than a /16, 82% are either a /14 or /15. As a result, most large
prefixes would need a maximum of 4 records to cover their entire range. Similarly, there are
309,000 AS prefixes which are between /17–/24, 82% of which are either a /22, /23, or /24.
Again, a vast majority could be covered by only a few delegated records.
One administrative approach, which allows incremental deployment among prefixes,
would be to place a udp record at the /16. Any AS prefixes wishing to use advertisement
records could then request to have the delegation bit set for the /24 subnets within their
prefix, allowing them to manage their own policies. If all ASs within the /16 later converge
on a single policy, this can be placed at the /16 level and delegations can be removed.

6.2

Estimating Advertisement Record Landscape

We begin our evaluation by estimating what the distribution of advertisement records may
look like. Specifically, we are interested in seeing how many /16s can be covered by a single
record, and how many have to delegate.
For this analysis, we look at the day-in-the-life (DITL) data of the DNS root servers
from 2019 [15]. This data captures all incoming queries to the root servers over a 48-hour
period. These queries typically come from recursive clients. We note that there is no data
available for g-root, and the data for i-root is anonymized and can therefore not be used in
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of announced prefix sizes. A vast majority of announced prefixes are
near in size to a /16 or /24, making advertisement records feasible.
our analysis. The other 11 servers are considered in our analysis. We also note that some
clients may run a local root server, and therefore, may never query the root servers [29].
For each IP address that queried the root servers, we record the number of UDP, TCP, and
Cookie queries sent.

6.2.1

Number of Possible none Records

Our first interest is in seeing how many subnets do not ever query the root servers. These
can be easily covered by a none advertisement record.
To our surprise, we find queries from every /16. In fact, each /16 had an average of
254 querying IPs, with the smallest being 38. This unexpected result means that no /16
can be covered with a single non-delegated none record. However, this may be beneficial for
the protocol. Every subnet has DNS architecture, and would therefore have an easier time
publishing a record.
Once we consider delegation we find that 66% of /24s do not send a query and can
therefore use a none record.
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6.2.2

Number of Delegated Records

We next consider how many instances of delegation from a /16 to /24 will be necessary. For
our estimations, we assume that a /16 selects the most prominent policy as the default, and
that /24s with different policies will be delegated to.
In every /16 subnet, none is the most common record that should be used by its
/24s. On average, there are 164 none subnets per /16 resulting in 92 (36%) subnets needing
delegation. By summing up all instances where delegation is necessary, we arrive at a total of
5,335,327 records at /24s. With the additional 216 records at the /16 level, approximately 5.4
million advertisement records would be necessary to cover the entire IPv4 address space in the
state we analyzed. It is important to note that configurations may change if advertisement
records are adopted. This could increase or decrease the total number of records required.

6.2.3

Uniformity within /24s

The advertisement protocol record is designed to have a maximum precision of a /24. It
is therefore necessary for all IPs within a /24 to follow the same policy. We examine the
uniformity within /24s to determine whether a record can apply to an entire /24 subnet.
As mentioned above, 2/3 of /24s have no queries and can be covered with a none
record. Of the remaining subnets with queries, 60% sent a query from only 1 IP address and
can thus use a policy that matches that IP.
For all subnets, we count how many IPs “favor” using UDP, TCP, and Cookies. We
define an IP as favoring an option if more queries used that option than the other two options.
For our estimations, we assume that if every IP within a subnet favors a particular protocol,
that protocol would be used in an advertisement record. We note that our estimations serve
only as a baseline and may not reflect real-world decisions. In particular, it is unrealistic
to expect clients (or entire subnets) to be TCP-only because there is no precedent in the
standards or software communities.
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We find 5.3 million /24s where all IPs favor UDP (89% of subnets with a query),
67,000 where all IPs favor TCP (1.1%), and 63,000 where all IPs favor Cookies (1.1%). Only
240,000 (4%) of /24 subnets have a set of IPs that favor multiple protocols. The remaining
4.4% of /24s did not have any IPs which favored any one particular protocol (e.g., they used
UDP and TCP equally). We also find that 110,000 (1.8%) subnets could adopt a cookie
advertisement record because all querying IPs used a cookie at least once.
Overall, the inside of a /24 is fairly uniform. Around 67% of subnets should adopt
a none record, 20% should adopt a record matching their single client, and the remaining
can typically match the option that all clients favor. Only 1.4% of all subnets could not be
covered by a single advertisement in their current condition. This relatively small group
would be required to update their clients before adopting an advertisement record.

6.3

Estimating Effectiveness for Server Adoption

Advertisement record’s effectiveness in reducing reflection-based attacks lies solely in the
number of servers that adopt support for enforcing records. If few servers participate,
publishing a record will have little to no effect as an attacker can still reflect off of a majority
of servers. As we saw previously, every /16 has at least one recursive client and therefore
the knowledge to publish an advertisement record. We hope that every subnet publishing a
record would also update their servers to perform enforcement.
We are not able to estimate the reduction in reflection-attacks created by a subset of
supporting servers because an attacker could simply utilize other servers. In this sense, the
protocol may not be effective until a high level of adoption is achieved. However, we do note
that attackers prefer to reflect off of servers that generate large responses. If these servers
adopted enforcement, an attack would be weakened and may not be considered cost-effective.
Macfarland et al. found that the average domain produces an amplification ratio of 3
for A records and 6 for ANY records [32]. However, the top 1 million largest domains produced
an amplification factor of 20–40. These 1 million domains were served from slightly less than
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25,000 servers of the 670,000 total servers they measured. What this means is that a targeted
adoption of just 3.7% of servers would result in the maximum achievable amplification being
reduced from 40× to 6×, a remarkable improvement. At a 6× amplification factor, the attack
against Spamhaus, which created 300Gbps of traffic [35], would have required the attacker to
have a bandwidth of 50Gbps as opposed to the estimated 3Gbps. While this value may be
achievable by some entities, it significantly raises the cost to participate. A reflection-based
attack also loses its value at this bandwidth, as other higher-cost attacks become possible.
Looking at recursive resolvers, there is no subset that should be targeted first. All of
the nearly 2 million recursive resolvers we discovered are capable of high amplification if the
attacker queries them for one of the large domains discussed previously.
One final avenue of adoption would be added support by major DNS software such as
BIND [24]. If major software added support that worked with a simple configuration option,
there may be a substantial uptick in adoption. We note here that DNS Cookies have been
supported by major software for up to 5 years at this point, but adoption remains at under
30% (see chapter 3). Still, if 30% of servers were to adopt advertisement enforcement, this
would, on average, reduce an attacker’s volume by 30%.
An attacker could attempt to learn which servers perform enforcement, but this would
require substantial effort. An attack would need to publish a policy (requiring ownership of
at least a /24) or have an IP address that is covered by a policy. They would then need to
send a non-compliant query to each server from their IP and determine whether the answer
is sent or not. While this is a one-time test, it adds a significant start-up cost to an attack.
In summary, enforcement by servers is essential, but also the largest challenge faced
by the protocol. We hope that as subnets publish an advertisement record, they also update
their servers accordingly. We found that if a specific subset of authoritative servers added
enforcement, overall amplification would drop significantly. However, the same does not hold
for recursive resolvers. We also found that widespread adoption may still be effective as it is
non-trivial for an attacker to determine if a server is using enforcement.
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Figure 6.2: Level of desire to implement server enforcement.
6.4

Server Incentives vs. Costs of Implementing Enforcement

As we have seen, advertisement record’s success depends on adoption by authoritative and
recursive DNS servers. While these servers play a crucial role, there are not many incentives
for them to adopt enforcement. Figure 6.2 provides a high-level overview of how likely
different entities are to adopt enforcement in their servers. An attacker’s server would have
no reason to adopt enforcement because doing so would remove the server from the pool
of reflectors. While we do not know how many DNS servers are controlled by malicious
entities, we expect the number to be low. On the other side, any servers that a potential
victim controls would have a high incentive level to adopt enforcement because they would
be reducing the possibilities of an attack.
Between these two sides are servers that act as bystanders. They are used for reflection
but do not see a significant gain from enforcing advertisements since they see only a moderate
level of traffic during a reflection attack. This is primarily due to the distributed nature of
most attacks which balances the load across bystanders. For example, 30,000 servers were
involved in the Spamhaus attack resulting in each only needing to generate ∼10 Mbps of
traffic [35]. On the other hand, there is a significant cost for these servers with the increased
load to perform advertisement lookups. We rank authoritative servers as having a higher cost
because they are not already equipped with a client-side for lookups as a recursive resolver is.
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6.4.1

How Many Queries?

Perhaps the largest burden to servers is the potential increase in the number of queries they
would have to perform for checking advertisement records. The scale of this burden depends
entirely on the number of unique IP addresses querying the server per day. As we saw on the
extreme end, 5.4 million records would be needed based upon queries sent to the root servers
over 2 days. This upper bound is likely too high as the data was distributed across 11 servers.
The root servers are also queried by most clients meaning that they see far more unique
traffic than a typical server. Additionally, we would not expect every subnet to publish an
advertisement, further reducing the total.
A more realistic number can be gathered by analyzing queries sent to BYU’s authoritative servers. For the first week of February 2021, BYU’s authoritative servers received
unique queries from an average of 15,246 IPs per day. The average number of /16s and /24s
querying per day was 978 and 3788 respectively. Assuming a typical TTL of one day for an
advertisement record, the best case would result in under 1,000 queries needed to learn the
advertisement policy of every incoming IP. This would occur if there was no delegation or
no advertisement records (resulting in negative caching). In the worst case, there would be
approximately 4,766 queries needed. This results when every IP exists in a different delegated
/24, resulting in a query for every /16 and /24.
Since we are analyzing BYU’s authoritative server, there is no baseline for the number
of outgoing queries sent per day (since the server does not have a client component). Still, we
can provide some reference by looking at the number of incoming queries per day. For BYU’s
servers, this averaged to 4,298,078 queries per day. We can expect that a server capable
of handling 4.3 million incoming queries a day would also be able to handle 1,000–5,000
outgoing queries.
We note that an analysis of BYU’s authoritative servers is not representative of the
entire population of servers. Servers for more popular sites, such as Google or Facebook, likely
see far more unique IP addresses. However, these servers are also likely to be designed for a
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higher volume of traffic. While we cannot make any claims, we believe that the increased
traffic would be very moderate for most servers.

Context for Outgoing Queries
While we were able to see the number of incoming queries handled by BYU’s authoritative
servers, this does not provide direct context for comparing against the ≤ 5, 000 outgoing
queries. Looking instead at BYU’s recursive resolvers, we found that an average of 8,617,274
outgoing queries were made between 7 am and 7 pm across two days (February 1–2, 2021).
In this instance, adding an additional 5,000 queries would have a negligible impact.
Another anecdotal example can be found by studying the number of queries sent by
stub resolvers. We analyzed queries sent from an author’s Android phone and Apple iPad
over a period spanning November 15, 2020, to February 13, 2021. For each day, the phone
averaged 6,905 outgoing queries while the iPad averaged 5,764. Both of these devices exceeded
the number of queries necessary for BYU’s authoritative servers to perform advertisement
enforcement. While this data is again not representative, we can expect that if mobile devices
can handle this volume of traffic, it should be negligible for dedicated hardware.

6.5

Potential Attack Vectors

When designing a new protocol, it is essential that it does not introduce new attack vectors.
If it does, attackers will simply shift their effort to exploiting the new vulnerability. Here
we discuss some potential new vectors and how they are mitigated. We also consider how
advertisement records would work against a traditional reflection attack when deployed during
an attack.
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6.5.1

Spoofing Advertisement Records

One attack vector would be to spoof an advertisement record with a more secure option
than is currently in use by the victim. This would effectively deny service to the subnet as
resolvers would reject legitimate packets that are not in compliance with the spoofed record.
The key to mitigating this vector is that the record is published by the subnet and
is queried by servers independent of any reflection queries. As we are only considering an
off-path attacker, they would be unable to intercept or modify the query for the advertisement
record.
An attacker could potentially attempt a cache poisoning attack for the advertisement
record. This would be plausible because an attacker can generally predict when the advertisement query would be sent (shortly after a packet is received claiming to be from the subnet).
This attack is easily mitigated by the use of DNS Cookies, 0x20 encoding, DNSSEC, or
source port randomization. These methods all introduce entropy which makes the attacker’s
ability to generate a valid response far less likely.

6.5.2

Flooding Servers

Another concern may be that an attacker could force a server to query for many advertisement
records, causing adverse effects. In this attack, an attacker would send spoofed packets from
every subnet to create a large workload for the server.
As we have seen in our data, the maximum amount of advertisement records for IPv4
is 5.4 million. This amount is unlikely to ever be reached unless every subnet deployed
records. On the other hand, we have anecdotally seen that BYU’s recursive resolver handles
8.6 million queries a day. As a result, an attack that spoofed a query from every /24 would
less than double the workload of the server. We do note, however, that an attacker utilizing
IPv6 would have far more records they could force a query for.
While this attack has the potential to have serious effects on DNS servers when using
IPv6, it is not a new vector. Without this protocol, an attacker could simply generate queries
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for random domain names and cause the same effect. DNS servers should be well equipped
to handle these attacks by rate-limiting queries and setting a maximum cache size: methods
that are already widely deployed in DNS software.
As a result, we are not concerned with the potential for an attacker to flood a DNS
server with advertisement lookups because this attack does not differ from other flooding
attempts and servers are well equipped to handle these scenarios.

6.5.3

Deploying Advertisement Records During an Attack

Advertisement records are primarily designed to be published in advance of any attack.
However, we recognize that some networks may not be incentivized to deploy advertisement
records until they are needed (e.g., during a denial of service attack).
In such a case, an advertisement record will be ineffective unless it is deployed before
all reflecting servers have been used. Otherwise, servers will have negatively cached the lack
of an advertisement record for the network and will not query for the new record. This
would result in all in-use reflecting servers continuing to be able to flood the victim until the
negative cache record expires (up to 24 hours later).
This shows that advertisement records are not a rapid solution for preventing an
ongoing attack. However, they work effectively when deployed in advance. Given the low
cost of adding the record, all networks should seek to protect themselves by publishing an
advertisement. Then if an attack were to occur, it could be successfully mitigated.
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Chapter 7
Discussion

7.1

Limitations and Future Work

Our work has demonstrated a need to enforce DNS Cookie use and has provided a solution:
advertisement records. However, there are several limitations to our work which in turn
present opportunities for future work.

7.1.1

Extending to IPv6

For advertisement records to be effective, it is necessary for them to cover both IPv4 and IPv6.
Otherwise, an attacker could simply target a victim’s unprotected IPv6 address. One option
may be to use a /48 as the starting point because higher subnets are typically controlled by
internet service providers. However, we did not evaluate the feasibility of using /48 subnets
from a client or server perspective. Delegation may use a /64; however, it may be that the
average /64 is too inconsistent to be covered by a single policy. Another issue may be that
the number of queries needed for a server to enforce policies becomes too great.
Future work should perform a similar analysis to our work with IPv6. It is key to
recognize that IPv6 deployment is an ongoing process with current measurements showing
less than 30% adoption [36]. As a result, the landscape may change over time and this may
affect the practicality of using advertisement records. It is therefore essential that future
efforts analyze IPv6 both from the current state and estimated future states.
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7.1.2

Limited Server Data

Another limitation of our work is the minimal dataset we had for the analysis of servers. We
focused purely on BYU’s authoritative server which is unlikely to be representative of a typical
server. Future work should look to analyze other authoritative server data. Particularly, data
for servers both more and less popular than BYU’s.
Since we were also limited to an authoritative dataset, we were not able to directly
compare the number of outgoing queries needed against the typical amount because the server
we analyzed made no queries. We did provide some context by looking at BYU’s recursive
data and a convenience sample of two mobile devices. Future work should seek to analyze
feasibility in open recursive resolvers where both incoming and outgoing queries could be
measured. This would allow a more precise estimate of the amount of work required by the
server relative to an average load.

7.1.3

Accuracy of Server Burden Estimations

Finally, our work was limited in details relating to the exact server implementation for
enforcement. For example, we did not specify a precise sequence of steps a server would take
when a new query is received. Would the server check its cache for an advertisement policy
every time a query is received? What impact on latency would this have? These questions
were not answered in our work, but can be explored in the future. There were also multiple
instances where we did not define a specific value such as the TTL of a negative record or
the number of queries that can be answered before enforcing a policy.
In large part, these specific details were excluded because they have little impact on
the overall protocol. However, they must be determined before an implementation can be
made. Later work should attempt to implement advertisement enforcement in an existing
piece of DNS software (e.g., BIND [24]). This would not only provide a proof-of-concept but
would also help in determining specific design choices.
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7.2

Conclusion

In this work, we have measured support for DNS Cookies and seen that while support has
grown to nearly 30% of servers and 10% of recursive clients, enforcement remains non-existent
in servers. 99% of servers responded to a client that was shown to support cookies in the
same manner when that client later excluded the cookie or sent an invalid cookie. In turn,
this means that nearly every server can continue to be abused in distributed denial of service
attacks that reflect off of them. These attacks have been shown to reach large volumes that
are able to disrupt major services.
We next presented a solution: advertisement records. With advertisement records, any
/16 subnet (and by delegation any /24) can publicly state which protocol their clients intend
to utilize (e.g., TCP or DNS Cookies). DNS servers are then able to look up these records
and enforce the provided policy by dropping non-compliant packets. This will effectively
prevent reflection attacks as the server will know to not send the answer to the victim.
Finally, we evaluated the potential effectiveness of advertisement records. We first
saw that adoption for clients is realistic. From an administrative perspective, only a handful
of autonomous systems exist per /16 subnet. We found that on average 66% of /24s would
need to be delegated to, but that there was high uniformity within nearly every /24.
While advertisement records are extremely easy to implement for clients, we saw that
there is an increased, albeit manageable, cost for servers to implement the enforcement. Our
analysis of BYU’s authoritative server found that it would need to query for at most 5,000
advertisement records: a small amount compared to the over 8 million queries performed a
day by BYU’s recursive resolver and inline with our sample of mobile stub resolvers. In this
regard, the overall cost to a server is manageable; however, servers that act as bystanders
benefit very little from enforcement. Another key is that the effectiveness of advertisement
records depends entirely on adoption by servers. While adoption by only a targeted portion
of authoritative servers is necessary to greatly reduce amplification amounts, all recursive
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resolvers would ultimately need to adopt enforcement (though a portion supporting the
protocol may weaken an attack).
While there is more work to be done, we believe that advertisement records have the
potential to reduce the effectiveness of denial of service attacks that utilize reflection. This
will solve a major issue that exists with the current DNS Cookie deployment. The mechanism
presented is very easy for clients to adopt, but may not provide enough incentives to see
widespread adoption among servers. Since server adoption is key to success, we hope that
future work will explore avenues for optimizing the protocol to reduce costs for servers.
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